Orange Pi5 kernel

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
 * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
 * Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
 * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH
 * Copyright (C) 2020-2021 Intel Corporation
 */
 
#include <linux/netdevice.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/ieee80211.h>
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
#include <net/mac80211.h>
#include <crypto/aes.h>
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
 
#include "ieee80211_i.h"
#include "michael.h"
#include "tkip.h"
#include "aes_ccm.h"
#include "aes_cmac.h"
#include "aes_gmac.h"
#include "aes_gcm.h"
#include "wpa.h"
 
ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
<------>u8 *data, *key, *mic;
<------>size_t data_len;
<------>unsigned int hdrlen;
<------>struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
<------>struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
<------>struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
<------>int tail;
 
<------>hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
<------>if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
<------>    skb->len < 24 || !ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
<------><------>return TX_CONTINUE;
 
<------>hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
<------>if (skb->len < hdrlen)
<------><------>return TX_DROP;
 
<------>data = skb->data + hdrlen;
<------>data_len = skb->len - hdrlen;
 
<------>if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) {
<------><------>/* Need to use software crypto for the test */
<------><------>info->control.hw_key = NULL;
<------>}
 
<------>if (info->control.hw_key &&
<------>    (info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_DONTFRAG ||
<------>     ieee80211_hw_check(&tx->local->hw, SUPPORTS_TX_FRAG)) &&
<------>    !(tx->key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC |
<------><------><------><------>     IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE))) {
<------><------>/* hwaccel - with no need for SW-generated MMIC or MIC space */
<------><------>return TX_CONTINUE;
<------>}
 
<------>tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
<------>if (!info->control.hw_key)
<------><------>tail += IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
 
<------>if (WARN(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
<------><------> skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN,
<------><------> "mmic: not enough head/tail (%d/%d,%d/%d)\n",
<------><------> skb_headroom(skb), IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN,
<------><------> skb_tailroom(skb), tail))
<------><------>return TX_DROP;
 
<------>mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
 
<------>if (tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE) {
<------><------>/* Zeroed MIC can help with debug */
<------><------>memset(mic, 0, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
<------><------>return TX_CONTINUE;
<------>}
 
<------>key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY];
<------>michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
<------>if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE))
<------><------>mic[0]++;
 
<------>return TX_CONTINUE;
}
 
 
ieee80211_rx_result
ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
{
<------>u8 *data, *key = NULL;
<------>size_t data_len;
<------>unsigned int hdrlen;
<------>u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN];
<------>struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
<------>struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
<------>struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
 
<------>/*
<------> * it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other
<------> * than data frames.
<------> */
<------>if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
<------><------>return RX_CONTINUE;
 
<------>/*
<------> * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it or
<------> * the IV with the key index. In this case we have solely rely
<------> * on the driver to set RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR in the event of a
<------> * MIC failure report.
<------> */
<------>if (status->flag & (RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) {
<------><------>if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
<------><------><------>goto mic_fail_no_key;
 
<------><------>if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) && rx->key &&
<------><------>    rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP)
<------><------><------>goto update_iv;
 
<------><------>return RX_CONTINUE;
<------>}
 
<------>/*
<------> * Some hardware seems to generate Michael MIC failure reports; even
<------> * though, the frame was not encrypted with TKIP and therefore has no
<------> * MIC. Ignore the flag them to avoid triggering countermeasures.
<------> */
<------>if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
<------>    !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
<------><------>return RX_CONTINUE;
 
<------>if (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP && rx->key->conf.keyidx) {
<------><------>/*
<------><------> * APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC
<------><------> * errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for
<------><------> * group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast
<------><------> * frames in the BSS.
<------><------> */
<------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
<------>}
 
<------>if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
<------><------>goto mic_fail;
 
<------>hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
<------>if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
<------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 
<------>if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
<------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
<------>hdr = (void *)skb->data;
 
<------>data = skb->data + hdrlen;
<------>data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
<------>key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
<------>michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
<------>if (crypto_memneq(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN))
<------><------>goto mic_fail;
 
<------>/* remove Michael MIC from payload */
<------>skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
 
update_iv:
<------>/* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
<------>rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip.iv32;
<------>rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip.iv16;
 
<------>return RX_CONTINUE;
 
mic_fail:
<------>rx->key->u.tkip.mic_failures++;
 
mic_fail_no_key:
<------>/*
<------> * In some cases the key can be unset - e.g. a multicast packet, in
<------> * a driver that supports HW encryption. Send up the key idx only if
<------> * the key is set.
<------> */
<------>cfg80211_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata->dev, hdr->addr2,
<------><------><------><------>     is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) ?
<------><------><------><------>     NL80211_KEYTYPE_GROUP :
<------><------><------><------>     NL80211_KEYTYPE_PAIRWISE,
<------><------><------><------>     rx->key ? rx->key->conf.keyidx : -1,
<------><------><------><------>     NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
<------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}
 
static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
<------>struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
<------>struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
<------>struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
<------>unsigned int hdrlen;
<------>int len, tail;
<------>u64 pn;
<------>u8 *pos;
 
<------>if (info->control.hw_key &&
<------>    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
<------>    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
<------><------>/* hwaccel - with no need for software-generated IV */
<------><------>return 0;
<------>}
 
<------>hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
<------>len = skb->len - hdrlen;
 
<------>if (info->control.hw_key)
<------><------>tail = 0;
<------>else
<------><------>tail = IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
 
<------>if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
<------><------>    skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN))
<------><------>return -1;
 
<------>pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
<------>memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen);
<------>pos += hdrlen;
 
<------>/* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
<------>if (info->control.hw_key &&
<------>    (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
<------><------>return 0;
 
<------>/* Increase IV for the frame */
<------>pn = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
<------>pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, &key->conf, pn);
 
<------>/* hwaccel - with software IV */
<------>if (info->control.hw_key)
<------><------>return 0;
 
<------>/* Add room for ICV */
<------>skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
 
<------>return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(&tx->local->wep_tx_ctx,
<------><------><------><------><------>   key, skb, pos, len);
}
 
 
ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
<------>struct sk_buff *skb;
 
<------>ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
 
<------>skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
<------><------>if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
<------><------><------>return TX_DROP;
<------>}
 
<------>return TX_CONTINUE;
}
 
 
ieee80211_rx_result
ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
{
<------>struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data;
<------>int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0;
<------>struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
<------>struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
<------>struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
 
<------>hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
 
<------>if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
<------><------>return RX_CONTINUE;
 
<------>if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12)
<------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 
<------>/* it may be possible to optimize this a bit more */
<------>if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
<------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
<------>hdr = (void *)skb->data;
 
<------>/*
<------> * Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption.
<------> * In the case where hardware checks the IV as well,
<------> * we don't even get here, see ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt()
<------> */
<------>if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)
<------><------>hwaccel = 1;
 
<------>res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(&rx->local->wep_rx_ctx,
<------><------><------><------><------>  key, skb->data + hdrlen,
<------><------><------><------><------>  skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
<------><------><------><------><------>  hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx,
<------><------><------><------><------>  &rx->tkip.iv32,
<------><------><------><------><------>  &rx->tkip.iv16);
<------>if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
<------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 
<------>/* Trim ICV */
<------>if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ICV_STRIPPED))
<------><------>skb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
 
<------>/* Remove IV */
<------>memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
<------>skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
 
<------>return RX_CONTINUE;
}
 
 
static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad)
{
<------>__le16 mask_fc;
<------>int a4_included, mgmt;
<------>u8 qos_tid;
<------>u16 len_a;
<------>unsigned int hdrlen;
<------>struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
 
<------>/*
<------> * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
<------> * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
<------> */
<------>mgmt = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control);
<------>mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
<------>mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
<------><------><------><------>IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
<------>if (!mgmt)
<------><------>mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
<------>mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
 
<------>hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
<------>len_a = hdrlen - 2;
<------>a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control);
 
<------>if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
<------><------>qos_tid = ieee80211_get_tid(hdr);
<------>else
<------><------>qos_tid = 0;
 
<------>/* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC
<------> * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived
<------> * from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the
<------> * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take
<------> * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting
<------> * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs.
<------> */
<------>b_0[0] = 0x1;
 
<------>/* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
<------> * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
<------> */
<------>b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
<------>memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
<------>memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
 
<------>/* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
<------> * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
<------>put_unaligned_be16(len_a, &aad[0]);
<------>put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
<------>memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
 
<------>/* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
<------>aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
<------>aad[23] = 0;
 
<------>if (a4_included) {
<------><------>memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
<------><------>aad[30] = qos_tid;
<------><------>aad[31] = 0;
<------>} else {
<------><------>memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
<------><------>aad[24] = qos_tid;
<------>}
}
 
 
static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id)
{
<------>hdr[0] = pn[5];
<------>hdr[1] = pn[4];
<------>hdr[2] = 0;
<------>hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
<------>hdr[4] = pn[3];
<------>hdr[5] = pn[2];
<------>hdr[6] = pn[1];
<------>hdr[7] = pn[0];
}
 
 
static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
{
<------>pn[0] = hdr[7];
<------>pn[1] = hdr[6];
<------>pn[2] = hdr[5];
<------>pn[3] = hdr[4];
<------>pn[4] = hdr[1];
<------>pn[5] = hdr[0];
}
 
 
static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb,
<------><------><------>    unsigned int mic_len)
{
<------>struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
<------>struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
<------>struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
<------>int hdrlen, len, tail;
<------>u8 *pos;
<------>u8 pn[6];
<------>u64 pn64;
<------>u8 aad[CCM_AAD_LEN];
<------>u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
 
<------>if (info->control.hw_key &&
<------>    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
<------>    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) &&
<------>    !((info->control.hw_key->flags &
<------>       IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) &&
<------>      ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) {
<------><------>/*
<------><------> * hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP
<------><------> * header or MIC fields
<------><------> */
<------><------>return 0;
<------>}
 
<------>hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
<------>len = skb->len - hdrlen;
 
<------>if (info->control.hw_key)
<------><------>tail = 0;
<------>else
<------><------>tail = mic_len;
 
<------>if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
<------><------>    skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
<------><------>return -1;
 
<------>pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
<------>memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
 
<------>/* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
<------>if (info->control.hw_key &&
<------>    (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
<------><------>return 0;
 
<------>hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) pos;
<------>pos += hdrlen;
 
<------>pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
 
<------>pn[5] = pn64;
<------>pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
<------>pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
<------>pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
<------>pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
<------>pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
 
<------>ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
 
<------>/* hwaccel - with software CCMP header */
<------>if (info->control.hw_key)
<------><------>return 0;
 
<------>pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
<------>ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
<------>return ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len,
<------><------><------><------><------> skb_put(skb, mic_len));
}
 
 
ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx,
<------><------><------>      unsigned int mic_len)
{
<------>struct sk_buff *skb;
 
<------>ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
 
<------>skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
<------><------>if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb, mic_len) < 0)
<------><------><------>return TX_DROP;
<------>}
 
<------>return TX_CONTINUE;
}
 
 
ieee80211_rx_result
ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx,
<------><------><------>      unsigned int mic_len)
{
<------>struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
<------>int hdrlen;
<------>struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
<------>struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
<------>struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
<------>u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN];
<------>int data_len;
<------>int queue;
 
<------>hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
 
<------>if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
<------>    !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb))
<------><------>return RX_CONTINUE;
 
<------>if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
<------><------>if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
<------><------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
<------><------>if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MIC_STRIPPED)
<------><------><------>mic_len = 0;
<------>} else {
<------><------>if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
<------><------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
<------>}
 
<------>/* reload hdr - skb might have been reallocated */
<------>hdr = (void *)rx->skb->data;
 
<------>data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len;
<------>if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
<------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 
<------>if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_PN_VALIDATED)) {
<------><------>int res;
 
<------><------>ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
 
<------><------>queue = rx->security_idx;
 
<------><------>res = memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue],
<------><------><------>     IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
<------><------>if (res < 0 ||
<------><------>    (!res && !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN))) {
<------><------><------>key->u.ccmp.replays++;
<------><------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
<------><------>}
 
<------><------>if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
<------><------><------>u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
<------><------><------>u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
<------><------><------>/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
<------><------><------>ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
 
<------><------><------>if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
<------><------><------><------>    key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad,
<------><------><------><------>    skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN,
<------><------><------><------>    data_len,
<------><------><------><------>    skb->data + skb->len - mic_len))
<------><------><------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
<------><------>}
 
<------><------>memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
<------><------>if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr)))
<------><------><------>memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
<------>}
 
<------>/* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
<------>if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - mic_len))
<------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
<------>memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
<------>skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
 
<------>return RX_CONTINUE;
}
 
static void gcmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad)
{
<------>__le16 mask_fc;
<------>u8 qos_tid;
<------>struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
 
<------>memcpy(j_0, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
<------>memcpy(&j_0[ETH_ALEN], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
<------>j_0[13] = 0;
<------>j_0[14] = 0;
<------>j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1] = 0x01;
 
<------>/* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
<------> * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC]
<------> */
<------>put_unaligned_be16(ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control) - 2, &aad[0]);
<------>/* Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
<------> * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
<------> */
<------>mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
<------>mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
<------><------><------><------>IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
<------>if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
<------><------>mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
<------>mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
 
<------>put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
<------>memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
 
<------>/* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
<------>aad[22] = *((u8 *)&hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
<------>aad[23] = 0;
 
<------>if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
<------><------>qos_tid = ieee80211_get_tid(hdr);
<------>else
<------><------>qos_tid = 0;
 
<------>if (ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control)) {
<------><------>memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
<------><------>aad[30] = qos_tid;
<------><------>aad[31] = 0;
<------>} else {
<------><------>memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
<------><------>aad[24] = qos_tid;
<------>}
}
 
static inline void gcmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, const u8 *pn, int key_id)
{
<------>hdr[0] = pn[5];
<------>hdr[1] = pn[4];
<------>hdr[2] = 0;
<------>hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
<------>hdr[4] = pn[3];
<------>hdr[5] = pn[2];
<------>hdr[6] = pn[1];
<------>hdr[7] = pn[0];
}
 
static inline void gcmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, const u8 *hdr)
{
<------>pn[0] = hdr[7];
<------>pn[1] = hdr[6];
<------>pn[2] = hdr[5];
<------>pn[3] = hdr[4];
<------>pn[4] = hdr[1];
<------>pn[5] = hdr[0];
}
 
static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
<------>struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
<------>struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
<------>struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
<------>int hdrlen, len, tail;
<------>u8 *pos;
<------>u8 pn[6];
<------>u64 pn64;
<------>u8 aad[GCM_AAD_LEN];
<------>u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
 
<------>if (info->control.hw_key &&
<------>    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
<------>    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) &&
<------>    !((info->control.hw_key->flags &
<------>       IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) &&
<------>      ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) {
<------><------>/* hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for GCMP
<------><------> * header or MIC fields
<------><------> */
<------><------>return 0;
<------>}
 
<------>hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
<------>len = skb->len - hdrlen;
 
<------>if (info->control.hw_key)
<------><------>tail = 0;
<------>else
<------><------>tail = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN;
 
<------>if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
<------><------>    skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN))
<------><------>return -1;
 
<------>pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN);
<------>memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
<------>skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) +
<------><------><------><------>    IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN);
 
<------>/* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
<------>if (info->control.hw_key &&
<------>    (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
<------><------>return 0;
 
<------>hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)pos;
<------>pos += hdrlen;
 
<------>pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
 
<------>pn[5] = pn64;
<------>pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
<------>pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
<------>pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
<------>pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
<------>pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
 
<------>gcmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
 
<------>/* hwaccel - with software GCMP header */
<------>if (info->control.hw_key)
<------><------>return 0;
 
<------>pos += IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN;
<------>gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad);
<------>return ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad, pos, len,
<------><------><------><------><------> skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN));
}
 
ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
<------>struct sk_buff *skb;
 
<------>ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
 
<------>skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
<------><------>if (gcmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
<------><------><------>return TX_DROP;
<------>}
 
<------>return TX_CONTINUE;
}
 
ieee80211_rx_result
ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
{
<------>struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
<------>int hdrlen;
<------>struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
<------>struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
<------>struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
<------>u8 pn[IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN];
<------>int data_len, queue, mic_len = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN;
 
<------>hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
 
<------>if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
<------>    !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb))
<------><------>return RX_CONTINUE;
 
<------>if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
<------><------>if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN))
<------><------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
<------><------>if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MIC_STRIPPED)
<------><------><------>mic_len = 0;
<------>} else {
<------><------>if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
<------><------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
<------>}
 
<------>/* reload hdr - skb might have been reallocated */
<------>hdr = (void *)rx->skb->data;
 
<------>data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len;
<------>if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
<------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 
<------>if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_PN_VALIDATED)) {
<------><------>int res;
 
<------><------>gcmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
 
<------><------>queue = rx->security_idx;
 
<------><------>res = memcmp(pn, key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue],
<------><------><------>     IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
<------><------>if (res < 0 ||
<------><------>    (!res && !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN))) {
<------><------><------>key->u.gcmp.replays++;
<------><------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
<------><------>}
 
<------><------>if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
<------><------><------>u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
<------><------><------>u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
<------><------><------>/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
<------><------><------>gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad);
 
<------><------><------>if (ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(
<------><------><------><------>    key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad,
<------><------><------><------>    skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN,
<------><------><------><------>    data_len,
<------><------><------><------>    skb->data + skb->len -
<------><------><------><------>    IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN))
<------><------><------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
<------><------>}
 
<------><------>memcpy(key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
<------><------>if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr)))
<------><------><------>memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
<------>}
 
<------>/* Remove GCMP header and MIC */
<------>if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - mic_len))
<------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
<------>memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
<------>skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN);
 
<------>return RX_CONTINUE;
}
 
static ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx,
<------><------><------>    struct sk_buff *skb)
{
<------>struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
<------>struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
<------>struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
<------>int hdrlen;
<------>u8 *pos, iv_len = key->conf.iv_len;
 
<------>if (info->control.hw_key &&
<------>    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
<------><------>/* hwaccel has no need for preallocated head room */
<------><------>return TX_CONTINUE;
<------>}
 
<------>if (unlikely(skb_headroom(skb) < iv_len &&
<------><------>     pskb_expand_head(skb, iv_len, 0, GFP_ATOMIC)))
<------><------>return TX_DROP;
 
<------>hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
 
<------>pos = skb_push(skb, iv_len);
<------>memmove(pos, pos + iv_len, hdrlen);
 
<------>return TX_CONTINUE;
}
 
static inline int ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(u8 *pn1, u8 *pn2, int len)
{
<------>int i;
 
<------>/* pn is little endian */
<------>for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
<------><------>if (pn1[i] < pn2[i])
<------><------><------>return -1;
<------><------>else if (pn1[i] > pn2[i])
<------><------><------>return 1;
<------>}
 
<------>return 0;
}
 
static ieee80211_rx_result
ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
{
<------>struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
<------>struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
<------>const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs = NULL;
<------>int hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
<------>struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb);
<------>int data_len;
<------>u8 *rx_pn;
<------>u8 *skb_pn;
<------>u8 qos_tid;
 
<------>if (!rx->sta || !rx->sta->cipher_scheme ||
<------>    !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
<------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 
<------>if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
<------><------>return RX_CONTINUE;
 
<------>cs = rx->sta->cipher_scheme;
 
<------>data_len = rx->skb->len - hdrlen - cs->hdr_len;
 
<------>if (data_len < 0)
<------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 
<------>if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
<------><------>qos_tid = ieee80211_get_tid(hdr);
<------>else
<------><------>qos_tid = 0;
 
<------>if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
<------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 
<------>hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
 
<------>rx_pn = key->u.gen.rx_pn[qos_tid];
<------>skb_pn = rx->skb->data + hdrlen + cs->pn_off;
 
<------>if (ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(skb_pn, rx_pn, cs->pn_len) <= 0)
<------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 
<------>memcpy(rx_pn, skb_pn, cs->pn_len);
 
<------>/* remove security header and MIC */
<------>if (pskb_trim(rx->skb, rx->skb->len - cs->mic_len))
<------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 
<------>memmove(rx->skb->data + cs->hdr_len, rx->skb->data, hdrlen);
<------>skb_pull(rx->skb, cs->hdr_len);
 
<------>return RX_CONTINUE;
}
 
static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad)
{
<------>__le16 mask_fc;
<------>struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
 
<------>/* BIP AAD: FC(masked) || A1 || A2 || A3 */
 
<------>/* FC type/subtype */
<------>/* Mask FC Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData flags to zero */
<------>mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
<------>mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | IEEE80211_FCTL_PM |
<------><------><------><------>IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
<------>put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *) &aad[0]);
<------>/* A1 || A2 || A3 */
<------>memcpy(aad + 2, &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
}
 
 
static inline void bip_ipn_set64(u8 *d, u64 pn)
{
<------>*d++ = pn;
<------>*d++ = pn >> 8;
<------>*d++ = pn >> 16;
<------>*d++ = pn >> 24;
<------>*d++ = pn >> 32;
<------>*d = pn >> 40;
}
 
static inline void bip_ipn_swap(u8 *d, const u8 *s)
{
<------>*d++ = s[5];
<------>*d++ = s[4];
<------>*d++ = s[3];
<------>*d++ = s[2];
<------>*d++ = s[1];
<------>*d = s[0];
}
 
 
ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
<------>struct sk_buff *skb;
<------>struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
<------>struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
<------>struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
<------>u8 aad[20];
<------>u64 pn64;
 
<------>if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
<------><------>return TX_DROP;
 
<------>skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
 
<------>info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
 
<------>if (info->control.hw_key &&
<------>    !(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIE))
<------><------>return TX_CONTINUE;
 
<------>if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
<------><------>return TX_DROP;
 
<------>mmie = skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
<------>mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
<------>mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
<------>mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
 
<------>/* PN = PN + 1 */
<------>pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
 
<------>bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
 
<------>if (info->control.hw_key)
<------><------>return TX_CONTINUE;
 
<------>bip_aad(skb, aad);
 
<------>/*
<------> * MIC = AES-128-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 64)
<------> */
<------>ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
<------><------><------>   skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
 
<------>return TX_CONTINUE;
}
 
ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
<------>struct sk_buff *skb;
<------>struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
<------>struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
<------>struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
<------>u8 aad[20];
<------>u64 pn64;
 
<------>if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
<------><------>return TX_DROP;
 
<------>skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
 
<------>info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
 
<------>if (info->control.hw_key)
<------><------>return TX_CONTINUE;
 
<------>if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
<------><------>return TX_DROP;
 
<------>mmie = skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
<------>mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
<------>mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
<------>mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
 
<------>/* PN = PN + 1 */
<------>pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
 
<------>bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
 
<------>bip_aad(skb, aad);
 
<------>/* MIC = AES-256-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 128)
<------> */
<------>ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
<------><------><------>       skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
 
<------>return TX_CONTINUE;
}
 
ieee80211_rx_result
ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
{
<------>struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
<------>struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
<------>struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
<------>struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
<------>u8 aad[20], mic[8], ipn[6];
<------>struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
 
<------>if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
<------><------>return RX_CONTINUE;
 
<------>/* management frames are already linear */
 
<------>if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
<------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 
<------>mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *)
<------><------>(skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
<------>if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
<------>    mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
<------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
 
<------>bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
 
<------>if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
<------><------>key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
<------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
<------>}
 
<------>if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
<------><------>/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
<------><------>bip_aad(skb, aad);
<------><------>ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
<------><------><------><------>   skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
<------><------>if (crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) {
<------><------><------>key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
<------><------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
<------><------>}
<------>}
 
<------>memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
 
<------>/* Remove MMIE */
<------>skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
 
<------>return RX_CONTINUE;
}
 
ieee80211_rx_result
ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_256_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
{
<------>struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
<------>struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
<------>struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
<------>struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
<------>u8 aad[20], mic[16], ipn[6];
<------>struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
 
<------>if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
<------><------>return RX_CONTINUE;
 
<------>/* management frames are already linear */
 
<------>if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
<------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 
<------>mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *)
<------><------>(skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
<------>if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
<------>    mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
<------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
 
<------>bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
 
<------>if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
<------><------>key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
<------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
<------>}
 
<------>if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
<------><------>/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
<------><------>bip_aad(skb, aad);
<------><------>ieee80211_aes_cmac_256(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
<------><------><------><------>       skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
<------><------>if (crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) {
<------><------><------>key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
<------><------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
<------><------>}
<------>}
 
<------>memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
 
<------>/* Remove MMIE */
<------>skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
 
<------>return RX_CONTINUE;
}
 
ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
<------>struct sk_buff *skb;
<------>struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
<------>struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
<------>struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
<------>struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
<------>u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN];
<------>u64 pn64;
<------>u8 nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN];
 
<------>if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
<------><------>return TX_DROP;
 
<------>skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
 
<------>info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
 
<------>if (info->control.hw_key)
<------><------>return TX_CONTINUE;
 
<------>if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
<------><------>return TX_DROP;
 
<------>mmie = skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
<------>mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
<------>mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
<------>mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
 
<------>/* PN = PN + 1 */
<------>pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
 
<------>bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
 
<------>bip_aad(skb, aad);
 
<------>hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
<------>memcpy(nonce, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
<------>bip_ipn_swap(nonce + ETH_ALEN, mmie->sequence_number);
 
<------>/* MIC = AES-GMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 128) */
<------>if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce,
<------><------><------>       skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic) < 0)
<------><------>return TX_DROP;
 
<------>return TX_CONTINUE;
}
 
ieee80211_rx_result
ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
{
<------>struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
<------>struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
<------>struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
<------>struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
<------>u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN], *mic, ipn[6], nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN];
<------>struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
 
<------>if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
<------><------>return RX_CONTINUE;
 
<------>/* management frames are already linear */
 
<------>if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
<------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 
<------>mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *)
<------><------>(skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
<------>if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
<------>    mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
<------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
 
<------>bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
 
<------>if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
<------><------>key->u.aes_gmac.replays++;
<------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
<------>}
 
<------>if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
<------><------>/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
<------><------>bip_aad(skb, aad);
 
<------><------>memcpy(nonce, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
<------><------>memcpy(nonce + ETH_ALEN, ipn, 6);
 
<------><------>mic = kmalloc(GMAC_MIC_LEN, GFP_ATOMIC);
<------><------>if (!mic)
<------><------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
<------><------>if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce,
<------><------><------><------>       skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24,
<------><------><------><------>       mic) < 0 ||
<------><------>    crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) {
<------><------><------>key->u.aes_gmac.icverrors++;
<------><------><------>kfree(mic);
<------><------><------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
<------><------>}
<------><------>kfree(mic);
<------>}
 
<------>memcpy(key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
 
<------>/* Remove MMIE */
<------>skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
 
<------>return RX_CONTINUE;
}
 
ieee80211_tx_result
ieee80211_crypto_hw_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
{
<------>struct sk_buff *skb;
<------>struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = NULL;
<------>ieee80211_tx_result res;
 
<------>skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
<------><------>info  = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
 
<------><------>/* handle hw-only algorithm */
<------><------>if (!info->control.hw_key)
<------><------><------>return TX_DROP;
 
<------><------>if (tx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_CIPHER_SCHEME) {
<------><------><------>res = ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(tx, skb);
<------><------><------>if (res != TX_CONTINUE)
<------><------><------><------>return res;
<------><------>}
<------>}
 
<------>ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
 
<------>return TX_CONTINUE;
}
 
ieee80211_rx_result
ieee80211_crypto_hw_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
{
<------>if (rx->sta && rx->sta->cipher_scheme)
<------><------>return ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(rx);
 
<------>return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
}