^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 1) /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 2)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 3) #ifndef _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 4) #define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 5)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 6) #include <linux/static_key.h>
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 7) #include <linux/objtool.h>
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 8)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 9) #include <asm/alternative.h>
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 10) #include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 11) #include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 12) #include <asm/msr-index.h>
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 13) #include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 14)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 15) /*
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 16) * Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 17) *
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 18) * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 19) * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 20) *
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 21) * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 22) * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 23) * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 24) * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 25) * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used.
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 26) *
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 27) * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 28) * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 29) * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there.
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 30) */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 31)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 32) #define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 33)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 34) /*
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 35) * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 36) * the optimal version — two calls, each with their own speculation
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 37) * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop.
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 38) */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 39) #define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 40) mov $(nr/2), reg; \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 41) 771: \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 42) ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL; \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 43) call 772f; \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 44) 773: /* speculation trap */ \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 45) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY; \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 46) pause; \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 47) lfence; \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 48) jmp 773b; \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 49) 772: \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 50) ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL; \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 51) call 774f; \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 52) 775: /* speculation trap */ \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 53) UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY; \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 54) pause; \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 55) lfence; \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 56) jmp 775b; \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 57) 774: \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 58) add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, sp; \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 59) dec reg; \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 60) jnz 771b;
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 61)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 62) #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 63)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 64) /*
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 65) * This should be used immediately before an indirect jump/call. It tells
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 66) * objtool the subsequent indirect jump/call is vouched safe for retpoline
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 67) * builds.
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 68) */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 69) .macro ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 70) .Lannotate_\@:
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 71) .pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 72) _ASM_PTR .Lannotate_\@
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 73) .popsection
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 74) .endm
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 75)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 76) /*
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 77) * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 78) * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 79) * attack.
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 80) */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 81) .macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 82) #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 83) ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg), \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 84) __stringify(jmp __x86_retpoline_\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 85) __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 86) #else
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 87) jmp *%\reg
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 88) #endif
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 89) .endm
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 90)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 91) .macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 92) #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 93) ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *%\reg), \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 94) __stringify(call __x86_retpoline_\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 95) __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *%\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 96) #else
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 97) call *%\reg
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 98) #endif
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 99) .endm
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 100)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 101) /*
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 102) * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 103) * monstrosity above, manually.
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 104) */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 105) .macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 106) #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 107) ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", "", \ftr
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 108) __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 109) .Lskip_rsb_\@:
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 110) #endif
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 111) .endm
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 112)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 113) #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 114)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 115) #define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 116) "999:\n\t" \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 117) ".pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe\n\t" \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 118) _ASM_PTR " 999b\n\t" \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 119) ".popsection\n\t"
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 120)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 121) #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 122) #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 123)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 124) /*
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 125) * Inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 126) * which is ensured when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is defined.
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 127) */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 128) # define CALL_NOSPEC \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 129) ALTERNATIVE_2( \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 130) ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 131) "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 132) "call __x86_retpoline_%V[thunk_target]\n", \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 133) X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 134) "lfence;\n" \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 135) ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 136) "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 137) X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 138)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 139) # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 140)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 141) #else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 142) /*
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 143) * For i386 we use the original ret-equivalent retpoline, because
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 144) * otherwise we'll run out of registers. We don't care about CET
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 145) * here, anyway.
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 146) */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 147) # define CALL_NOSPEC \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 148) ALTERNATIVE_2( \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 149) ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 150) "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 151) " jmp 904f;\n" \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 152) " .align 16\n" \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 153) "901: call 903f;\n" \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 154) "902: pause;\n" \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 155) " lfence;\n" \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 156) " jmp 902b;\n" \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 157) " .align 16\n" \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 158) "903: lea 4(%%esp), %%esp;\n" \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 159) " pushl %[thunk_target];\n" \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 160) " ret;\n" \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 161) " .align 16\n" \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 162) "904: call 901b;\n", \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 163) X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 164) "lfence;\n" \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 165) ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 166) "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 167) X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 168)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 169) # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 170) #endif
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 171) #else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 172) # define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n"
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 173) # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 174) #endif
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 175)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 176) /* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 177) enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 178) SPECTRE_V2_NONE,
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 179) SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE,
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 180) SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE,
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 181) SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS,
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 182) SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 183) SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE,
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 184) };
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 185)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 186) /* The indirect branch speculation control variants */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 187) enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation {
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 188) SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE,
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 189) SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT,
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 190) SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED,
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 191) SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL,
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 192) SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP,
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 193) };
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 194)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 195) /* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 196) enum ssb_mitigation {
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 197) SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE,
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 198) SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE,
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 199) SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL,
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 200) SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP,
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 201) };
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 202)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 203) extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 204) extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 205)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 206) static __always_inline
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 207) void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr, u64 val, unsigned int feature)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 208) {
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 209) asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", "wrmsr", %c[feature])
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 210) : : "c" (msr),
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 211) "a" ((u32)val),
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 212) "d" ((u32)(val >> 32)),
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 213) [feature] "i" (feature)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 214) : "memory");
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 215) }
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 216)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 217) static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 218) {
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 219) u64 val = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 220)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 221) alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, val, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 222) }
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 223)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 224) /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 225) extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 226)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 227) /*
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 228) * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 229) * before calling into firmware.
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 230) *
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 231) * (Implemented as CPP macros due to header hell.)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 232) */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 233) #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start() \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 234) do { \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 235) u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 236) \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 237) preempt_disable(); \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 238) alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 239) X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 240) } while (0)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 241)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 242) #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end() \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 243) do { \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 244) u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base; \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 245) \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 246) alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val, \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 247) X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 248) preempt_enable(); \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 249) } while (0)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 250)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 251) DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 252) DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 253) DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 254)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 255) DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 256) DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 257)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 258) #include <asm/segment.h>
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 259)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 260) /**
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 261) * mds_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 262) *
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 263) * This uses the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 264) * combination with microcode which triggers a CPU buffer flush when the
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 265) * instruction is executed.
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 266) */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 267) static __always_inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 268) {
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 269) static const u16 ds = __KERNEL_DS;
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 270)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 271) /*
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 272) * Has to be the memory-operand variant because only that
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 273) * guarantees the CPU buffer flush functionality according to
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 274) * documentation. The register-operand variant does not.
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 275) * Works with any segment selector, but a valid writable
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 276) * data segment is the fastest variant.
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 277) *
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 278) * "cc" clobber is required because VERW modifies ZF.
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 279) */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 280) asm volatile("verw %[ds]" : : [ds] "m" (ds) : "cc");
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 281) }
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 282)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 283) /**
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 284) * mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 285) *
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 286) * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 287) */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 288) static __always_inline void mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 289) {
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 290) if (static_branch_likely(&mds_user_clear))
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 291) mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 292) }
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 293)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 294) /**
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 295) * mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 296) *
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 297) * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 298) */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 299) static inline void mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 300) {
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 301) if (static_branch_likely(&mds_idle_clear))
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 302) mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 303) }
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 304)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 305) #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 306)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 307) /*
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 308) * Below is used in the eBPF JIT compiler and emits the byte sequence
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 309) * for the following assembly:
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 310) *
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 311) * With retpolines configured:
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 312) *
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 313) * callq do_rop
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 314) * spec_trap:
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 315) * pause
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 316) * lfence
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 317) * jmp spec_trap
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 318) * do_rop:
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 319) * mov %rcx,(%rsp) for x86_64
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 320) * mov %edx,(%esp) for x86_32
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 321) * retq
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 322) *
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 323) * Without retpolines configured:
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 324) *
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 325) * jmp *%rcx for x86_64
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 326) * jmp *%edx for x86_32
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 327) */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 328) #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 329) # ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 330) # define RETPOLINE_RCX_BPF_JIT_SIZE 17
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 331) # define RETPOLINE_RCX_BPF_JIT() \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 332) do { \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 333) EMIT1_off32(0xE8, 7); /* callq do_rop */ \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 334) /* spec_trap: */ \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 335) EMIT2(0xF3, 0x90); /* pause */ \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 336) EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8); /* lfence */ \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 337) EMIT2(0xEB, 0xF9); /* jmp spec_trap */ \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 338) /* do_rop: */ \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 339) EMIT4(0x48, 0x89, 0x0C, 0x24); /* mov %rcx,(%rsp) */ \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 340) EMIT1(0xC3); /* retq */ \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 341) } while (0)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 342) # else /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 343) # define RETPOLINE_EDX_BPF_JIT() \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 344) do { \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 345) EMIT1_off32(0xE8, 7); /* call do_rop */ \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 346) /* spec_trap: */ \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 347) EMIT2(0xF3, 0x90); /* pause */ \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 348) EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8); /* lfence */ \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 349) EMIT2(0xEB, 0xF9); /* jmp spec_trap */ \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 350) /* do_rop: */ \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 351) EMIT3(0x89, 0x14, 0x24); /* mov %edx,(%esp) */ \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 352) EMIT1(0xC3); /* ret */ \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 353) } while (0)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 354) # endif
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 355) #else /* !CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 356) # ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 357) # define RETPOLINE_RCX_BPF_JIT_SIZE 2
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 358) # define RETPOLINE_RCX_BPF_JIT() \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 359) EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE1); /* jmp *%rcx */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 360) # else /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 361) # define RETPOLINE_EDX_BPF_JIT() \
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 362) EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE2) /* jmp *%edx */
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 363) # endif
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 364) #endif
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 365)
^8f3ce5b39 (kx 2023-10-28 12:00:06 +0300 366) #endif /* _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ */